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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge: 
 
This bankruptcy appeal requires us to construe 11 
U.S.C. S 510(b), which provides for the subordination of any 
claim for damages "arising from the purchase or sale" of a 
security of the debtor. The appeal arises out of a Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy petition filed by appellee Telegroup, Inc. 
Appellants Baroda Hill Investments, Ltd., LeHeron 
Corporation, Ltd., and Kimble John Winter ("claimants" or 
"appellants") are shareholders of Telegroup who filed proofs 
of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding seeking damages for 
Telegroup's alleged breach of its agreement to use its best 
efforts to ensure that their stock was registered and freely 
tradeable. Claimants appeal from an order of the District 
Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court's order subordinating 
their claims against the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 
S 510(b). 
 
Claimants argue that S 510(b) should be construed 
narrowly, so that only claims for actionable conduct-- 
typically some type of fraud or other illegality in the 
issuance of stock -- that occurred at the time of the 
purchase or sale of stock would be deemed to arise from 
that purchase or sale. Put differently, in claimants' 
submission, a claim must be predicated on illegality in the 
stock's issuance to be subordinated under S 510(b). Since 
the actionable conduct in this case (Telegroup's breach of 
contract) occurred after claimants' purchase of Telegroup's 
stock, claimants contend that the District Court erred in 
subordinating their claims. 
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Telegroup would read S 510(b) more broadly, so that 
claims for breach of a stock purchase agreement, which 
would not have arisen but for the purchase of Telegroup's 
stock, may arise from that purchase, even though the 
actionable conduct occurred after the transaction was 
completed. Telegroup further argues that subordinating 
appellants' claims advances the policies underlyingS 510(b) 
by preventing disappointed equity investors from recovering 
a portion of their investment in parity with bona fide 
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
We agree with Telegroup, and hold that a claim for 
breach of a provision in a stock purchase agreement 
requiring the issuer to use its best efforts to register its 
stock and ensure that the stock is freely tradeable"arises 
from" the purchase of the stock for purposes ofS 510(b), 





The relevant facts are undisputed, and can be succinctly 
summarized. Appellant LeHeron Corporation, Ltd. sold to 
Telegroup the assets of certain businesses that it owned in 
exchange for shares of Telegroup's common stock and a 
small amount of cash. As amended on June 5, 1998, the 
stock purchase agreements required Telegroup to use its 
best efforts to register its stock and ensure that the shares 
were freely tradeable by June 25, 1998. On February 10, 
1999, Telegroup filed a voluntary Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
petition, and on June 7, 1999, appellants filed proofs of 
claim against the bankruptcy estate alleging that Telegroup 
breached its agreement to use its best efforts to register its 
stock. Claimants sought damages on the theory that had 
Telegroup performed its obligation under the contract, they 
would have sold their shares as soon as Telegroup's stock 
became freely tradeable, thereby avoiding the losses 
incurred when Telegroup's stock subsequently declined in 
value. 
 
Telegroup filed objections to these claims, asking the 
Bankruptcy Court to subordinate the claims pursuant to 
S 510(b), which provides that any claim for damages 
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"arising from the purchase or sale" of common stock shall 
have the same priority in the distribution of the estate's 
assets as common stock. The Bankruptcy Court filed a 
written opinion and order subordinating appellants' claims, 
holding that because appellants' claims would not exist but 
for their purchase of Telegroup's stock, the claims arise 
from that purchase for purposes of S 510(b). The District 
Court affirmed, and claimants filed this appeal. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(d). Because the District Court sat below as an 
appellate court, this Court conducts the same review of the 
Bankruptcy Court's order as did the District Court. See In 
re O'Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 
1999). As the relevant facts are undisputed, this appeal 







Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
 
       For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim 
       arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a 
       security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for 
       damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a 
       security, or for reimbursement or contribution allowed 
       under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be 
       subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior 
       to or equal the claim or interest represented by such 
       security, except that if such security is common stock, 
       such claim has the same priority as common stock. 
 
In this case, the question is whether appellants' breach of 
contract claim is "a claim . . . for damages arising from the 
purchase or sale of . . . a security [of the debtor]." Id. 
Claimants concede that the securities that they purchased 
from Telegroup are common stock. Therefore, if their claims 
"arise from" the purchase of that stock, then under S 510(b) 
their claims would have the same priority as common 
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stock, and would be subordinated to the claims of general 
unsecured creditors. 
 
The question of the scope of S 510(b) presents this Court 
with a matter of first impression. Those courts that have 
considered the issue appear divided on how broadly the 
phrase "arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security" 
should be construed. Compare, e.g., In re Amarex, Inc., 78 
B.R. 605, 610 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (holding that under 
S 510(b), a claim does not arise from the purchase or sale 
of a security if it is predicated on conduct that occurred 
after the security's issuance), with In re NAL Fin. Group, 
Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that 
claims for breach of the debtor's agreement to use its best 
efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of 
those securities, for purposes of S 510(b)). 
 
In construing S 510(b), we begin, as we must, with the 
text of the statute. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 
337, 340 (1997) ("[The] first step in interpreting a statute is 
to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute 
in the case."). The inquiry "must cease if the statutory 
language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is 
coherent and consistent." Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 
Claimants argue that their claims do not arise from the 
purchase or sale of Telegroup's common stock because a 
claim "aris[es] from the purchase or sale of . . . a security" 
only if the claim alleges that the purchase or sale of the 
security was itself unlawful. According to claimants, a claim 
does not arise from the purchase or sale of a security if it 
is predicated on conduct that occurred after the purchase 
or sale. See In re Amarex, Inc., 78 B.R. 605, 610 (W.D. 
Okla. 1987) (holding that a claim for breach of a 
partnership agreement, because it is based on conduct that 
occurred after the issuance and sale of the partnership 
units, does not arise from the purchase or sale of those 
units); In re Angeles Corp., 177 B.R. 920, 926 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1995) (holding that claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
do not arise from the purchase or sale of limited 
partnership interests where the wrongful conduct occurred 
after the sale of those interests); see also In re Montgomery 
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Ward Holding Corp., No. 97-1409, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 158 
at *20 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 16, 2001) (holding that a claim 
arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there 
is "an allegation of fraud in the purchase, sale or issuance 
of the . . . instrument"). Since the actionable conduct in 
this case includes Telegroup's alleged post-sale breach of 
contract, in claimants' submission the claim does not arise 
from the purchase or sale of debtor's stock, and therefore 
should not be subordinated under S 510(b). 
 
Telegroup responds that claims arising from the 
purchase or sale of a security under S 510(b) include claims 
predicated on post-issuance conduct. See In re Geneva 
Steel Co., 260 B.R. 517 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the 
claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the 
debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities, 
for purposes of S 510(b)); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 
B.R. 332, 333-34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that 
claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain 
debtor's securities arise from the purchase or sale of those 
securities); see also In re Lenco, Inc., 116 B.R. 141 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that claims for ERISA violations 
arose from the purchase or sale of debtor's securities). 
 
Telegroup contends that appellants' claims "arise from" 
the purchase or sale of Telegroup's common stock because 
they allege a breach of the purchase agreement whereby 
claimants acquired shares of Telegroup stock, which 
required Telegroup to use its best efforts to register its 
stock. See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that claims for breach of debtor's 
agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities 
arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of 
S 510(b)); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 
823 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a claim for breach of a 
provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase 
or sale of the debtor's securities); In re Int'l Wireless 
Communications Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2001) (disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, 
and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a 
supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the 
purchase or sale of those securities); In re Kaiser Group 
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Int'l, Inc., 260 B.R. 684 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (holding that 
claims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the 
purchase or sale of debtor's securities). Therefore, in 
Telegroup's submission, the Bankruptcy Court correctly 
subordinated appellants' claims pursuant to S 510(b). 
 
We conclude that the phrase "arising from" is ambiguous. 
For a claim to "aris[e] from the purchase or sale of . . . a 
security," there must obviously be some nexus or causal 
relationship between the claim and the sale of the security, 
but S 510(b)'s language alone provides little guidance in 
delineating the precise scope of the required nexus. On the 
one hand, it is reasonable, as a textual matter, to hold that 
the claims in this case do not "arise from" the purchase or 
sale of Telegroup's stock, since the claims are predicated on 
conduct that occurred after the stock was purchased. On 
the other hand, it is, in our view, more natural, as a textual 
matter, to read "arising from" as requiring some nexus or 
causal relationship between the claims and the purchase of 
the securities, but not as limiting the nexus to claims 
alleging illegality in the purchase itself. In particular, the 
text of S 510(b) is reasonably read to encompass the claims 
in this case, since the claims would not have arisen but for 
the purchase of Telegroup's stock and allege a breach of a 
provision of the stock purchase agreement. 
 
Although we believe that Telegroup's reading ofS 510(b) 
is the more comfortable reading of the provision as a 
textual matter, we acknowledge that the language "arising 
from" is nonetheless susceptible to claimants' construction. 
Because the text of S 510(b) is ambiguous as applied to the 
claims in this case, we turn to the provision's legislative 
history and the policies underlying the provision, to 
determine whether the claims "arise from" the purchase of 




Both the House Report on the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Revisions and the Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy 
Laws, whose proposed legislation was largely adopted by 
the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, suggest that 
in enacting S 510(b), Congress was focusing on claims 
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alleging fraud or other violations of securities laws in the 
issuance of the debtor's securities. See Report of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Law Revision, 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 194 (1977) ("A difficult policy 
question to be resolved in a business bankruptcy concerns 
the relative status of a security holder who seeks to rescind 
his purchase of securities or to sue for damages based on 
such a purchase: Should he be treated as a general 
unsecured creditor based on his tort claim for rescission, or 
should his claim be subordinated?"); Report of the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 116 (1973) (commenting 
that the proposed provision "subordinates claims by 
holders of securities of a debtor corporation that are based 
on federal and state securities legislation, rules pursuant 
thereto, and similar laws"). 
 
In enacting S 510(b), Congress relied heavily on a law 
review article written by Professors John J. Slain and 
Homer Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation 
and Bankruptcy -- Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities 
Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's 
Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 261 (1973). See  H.R. Rep. No. 
95-595, at 196 (summarizing the argument in the 
Slain/Kripke article and stating that "[t]he bill generally 
adopts the Slain/Kripke position"); id. at 194 ("The 
argument for mandatory subordination is best described by 
Professors Slain and Kripke."); In re Betacom of Phoenix, 
Inc., 240 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Congress relied 
heavily on the analysis of two law professors in crafting the 
statute."); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 336 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Any discussion of section 510(b) 
must begin with the 1973 law review article authored by 
Professors John J. Slain and Homer Kripke . . . ."). 
 
Slain and Kripke argued that claims of shareholders 
alleging fraud or other illegality in the issuance of stock 
should generally be subordinated to the claims of general 
unsecured creditors, conceptualizing the issue as one of 
risk allocation. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy 
Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 777 (1987) ("[B]ankruptcy 
policy becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better 
answer to the question, `How shall the losses be 
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distributed?' "). Slain and Kripke argued that"[t]he 
situation with which we are concerned involves two risks: 
(1) the risk of business insolvency from whatever cause; 
and (2) the risk of illegality in securities issuance." Slain & 
Kripke, supra, at 286. 
 
Analyzing the first risk -- that of business insolvency -- 
Slain and Kripke observed that the absolute priority rule 
allocates this risk to shareholders. Under the absolute 
priority rule, "stockholders seeking to recover their 
investments cannot be paid before provable creditor claims 
have been satisfied in full." Id. at 261; see generally Consol. 
Rock Prods. Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1941) 
(holding that stockholders cannot participate in a plan of 
reorganization unless creditors' claims have been satisfied 
in full); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co. , 308 U.S. 
106 (1939) (same); see also Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace 
Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 436 n.2 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the history of the absolute priority 
rule). 
 
The rationale for the absolute priority rule rests on the 
different risk-return packages purchased by stockholders 
and general creditors: 
 
       In theory, the general creditor asserts a fixed dollar 
       claim and leaves the variable profit to the stockholder; 
       the stockholder takes the profit and provides a cushion 
       of security for payment of the lender's fixed dollar 
       claim. The absolute priority rule reflects the different 
       degree to which each party assumes a risk of 
       enterprise insolvency . . . . 
 
Slain & Kripke, supra, at 286-87; see also Warren, supra, 
at 792 ("An almost axiomatic principle of business law is 
that, because equity owners stand to gain the most when a 
business succeeds, they should absorb the costs of the 
business's collapse -- up to the full amount of their 
investment."). Thus, argued Slain and Kripke, the absolute 
priority rule allocates to stockholders the risk of business 
insolvency, and "no obvious reason exists for reallocating 
that risk." Slain & Kripke, supra, at 287. 
 
Analyzing the second risk -- the risk of illegality in the 
issuance of stock -- Slain and Kripke argued that this risk, 
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too, should be born by shareholders. "It is difficult to 
conceive of any reason for shifting even a small portion of 
the risk of illegality from the stockholder, since it is to the 
stockholder, and not to the creditor, that the stock is 
offered." Id. at 288. Slain and Kripke therefore concluded 
that shareholder claims alleging illegality in the issuance of 
stock should be subordinated to the claims of general 
unsecured creditors. 
 
The focus of the Slain/Kripke article suggests that 
Congress considered claims alleging fraud or other illegality 
in the issuance of securities to be at the core of claims that 
"aris[e] from the purchase or sale of . . . a security" for 
purposes of S 510(b). See Slain & Kripke, supra, at 267 
("For present purposes it suffices to say that when the basis 
of the stockholder's disaffection is either the issuer's failure 
to comply with registration requirements or the issuer's 
material misrepresentations, one or more state or federal 
claims may be made."). Indeed, the title of their article -- 
"The Interface Between Securities Regulation and 
Bankruptcy -- Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities 
Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's 
Creditors" -- indicates that Slain and Kripke were primarily 
concerned with actionable conduct occurring in the 
issuance of the debtor's securities, as opposed to post- 
issuance conduct. 
 
This focus in the legislative history on fraud or other 
illegality in the securities' issuance supports claimants' 
argument that their claims do not arise from the purchase 
or sale of Telegroup's stock because the actionable conduct 
(the breach of Telegroup's agreement to use its best efforts 
to register its stock) occurred after the sale was completed, 
and did not involve any fraud or violation of securities laws 
in the issuance itself. Although we thus agree with 
claimants that claims alleging illegality in the issuance of 
securities fall squarely within the intended scope of 
S 510(b), we cannot find anything in the legislative history 
indicating that Congress intended to limit the scope of 
S 510(b) to only such claims. In fact, Slain and Kripke 
explicitly declined to delineate the exact boundary between 
those shareholder claims that should be subordinated and 
those that should not. See Slain & Kripke, supra, at 267 
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("We are only incidentally concerned with the precise 
predicate of a disaffected stockholder's efforts to recapture 
his investment from the corporation."). We therefore read 
the specific types of claims referred to in the legislative 
history as "arising from" the purchase or sale of a security 
as illustrative, not exhaustive, examples of claims that 
must be subordinated pursuant to S 510(b). 
 
While the legislative history fails to define explicitly the 
intended scope of S 510(b), the legislative history, by 
adopting the Slain/Kripke argument, sheds light on the 
policies animating S 510(b), which provide guidance in 
deciding whether the claims in this case arise from the 
purchase of Telegroup's stock. Ultimately, the Slain and 
Kripke proposal that inspired S 510(b) appears intended to 
prevent disappointed shareholders from recovering the 
value of their investment by filing bankruptcy claims 
predicated on the issuer's unlawful conduct at the time of 
issuance, when the shareholders assumed the risk of 
business failure by investing in equity rather than debt 
instruments. See Slain & Kripke, supra , at 267 (framing the 
problem in terms of "a disaffected stockholder's efforts to 
recapture his investment from the corporation"); id. at 261 
("In these cases, a dissatisfied investor may rescind his 
purchase of stock or subordinated debt by proving that the 
transaction violated federal or state securities laws."); id. at 
268 ("[I]nvestors in stock or in subordinated debentures 
may be able to bootstrap their way to parity with, or 
preference over, general creditors even in the absence of 
express contractual rights."). 
 
Section 510(b) thus represents a Congressional judgment 
that, as between shareholders and general unsecured 
creditors, it is shareholders who should bear the risk of 
illegality in the issuance of stock in the event the issuer 
enters bankruptcy. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 22 
(1973) (recommending "that claims by stockholders of a 
corporate debtor for rescission or damages, which if allowed 
will promote them to the status of creditors, be 
subordinated to the claims of the real creditors"). With 
these policies in mind, we now turn to the application of 
S 510(b) to the claims at issue in this case. 
 






Claimants' reading of S 510(b) as requiring the 
subordination of only those claims alleging fraud or 
actionable conduct in the issuance not only is plausible as 
a textual matter, see supra Section II.A, but also has some 
appeal at an abstract level, as noted in the margin. 1 
Nonetheless, the distinction that claimants' reading of 
S 510(b) draws between actionable conduct that occurred at 
the time of the purchase of the security and actionable 
conduct that occurred after the purchase seems to us to 
lack any meaningful basis as a matter of Congressional 
policy, and therefore provides an inadequate resolution of 
the ambiguity in the text of S 510(b) as applied to the 
claims in this case. As discussed above, Congress enacted 
S 510(b) to prevent disappointed shareholders from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because appellants' claims are for breach of a contractual provision 
intended to limit their investment risk, their claims are arguably 
analogous to unsecured creditors' claims on promissory notes, and 
therefore should enjoy the same priority. In both cases, the claims are 
for breach of a contractual provision -- in the case of claimants suing on 
a promissory note, the contractual provision requires the debtor to repay 
the loan, and in this case, the contractual provision requires the debtor 
to use its best efforts to register its stock. In both cases the 
contractual 
provision limits the claimants' investment risk-- in the case of a 
promissory note, the contractual provision ensures that noteholders will 
be paid before any profits are distributed to shareholders, and in this 
case, the contractual provision ensures that stockholders can sell their 
stock if the corporation begins to fail, thereby recovering at least a 
portion of their investment. 
 
Moreover, in both cases, the contractual provision limiting the 
investment risk is acquired in exchange for a lower rate of return -- in 
the case of noteholders, the promissory note provides only a fixed rate of 
return, and in this case, the issuer's agreement to use its best efforts 
to 
register its stock presumably increased the price claimants paid for the 
stock, thereby decreasing their expected return. This analogy between 
the claims of unsecured creditors suing on promissory notes and the 
claims of shareholders suing for breach of the issuer's agreement to use 
its best efforts to register its stock therefore suggests that appellants' 
claims should not be subordinated under S 510(b), and should be given 
the same priority as the claims of general unsecured creditors. 
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recovering their investment loss by using fraud and other 
securities claims to bootstrap their way to parity with 
general unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
Nothing in this rationale would distinguish those 
shareholder claims predicated on post-issuance conduct 
from those shareholder claims predicated on conduct that 
occurred during the issuance itself. Cf. In re Granite 
Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 342 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
("[T]here is no good reason to distinguish between allocating 
the risks of fraud in the purchase of a security and post- 
investment fraud that adversely affects the ability to sell (or 
hold) the investment; both are investment risks that the 
investors have assumed."). 
 
More important than the timing of the actionable 
conduct, from a policy standpoint, is the fact that the 
claims in this case seek to recover a portion of claimants' 
equity investment. In enacting S 510(b), Congress intended 
to prevent disaffected equity investors from recouping their 
investment losses in parity with general unsecured 
creditors in the event of bankruptcy. Since claimants in 
this case are equity investors seeking compensation for a 
decline in the value of Telegroup's stock, we believe that the 
policies underlying S 510(b) require resolving the textual 
ambiguity in favor of subordinating their claims. Put 
differently, because claimants retained the right to 
participate in corporate profits if Telegroup succeeded, we 
believe that S 510(b) prevents them from using their breach 
of contract claim to recover the value of their equity 
investment in parity with general unsecured creditors. Were 
we to rule in claimants' favor in this case, we would allow 
stockholders in claimants' position to retain their stock and 
share in the corporation's profits if the corporation 
succeeds, and to recover a portion of their investment in 
parity with creditors if the corporation fails. 
 
Claimants argue that they never intended to retain their 
equity investment and share in Telegroup's profits, and 
submitted affidavits asserting that they intended to 
liquidate their shares as soon as Telegroup registered its 
stock and the stock became publicly tradeable. See 
Appellants' Brief at 26 ("The Claimants had no desire to 
become long-term investors in the Debtor. They accepted 
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the shares as a cash substitute and intended immediately 
to sell those shares once the shares were registered."). 
 
We have difficulty believing that if Telegroup's business 
prospects had suddenly improved and its profits had gone 
through the roof, claimants would nonetheless have 
liquidated their shares as soon as they became publicly 
tradeable. No profit-maximizing shareholder would liquidate 
her shares if the shareholder believed the expected return 
would exceed the shares' market value. Indeed, had 
claimants intended to liquidate their shares as soon as 
possible, they would have filed breach of contract claims 
immediately on June 25, 1998, when the contract was 
initially breached, rather than waiting until June 7, 1999, 
nearly a year later, to file their claims. Furthermore, if as 
claimants now contend, they never intended to assume any 
of the investment risks of equity-holders, it is unclear why 
they did not purchase non-equity securities with a fixed 
rate of return. The fact that claimants chose to invest in 
equity rather than debt instruments suggests that they 
preferred to retain the right to participate in profits, and 
with it, the risk of losing their investment if the business 
failed. 
 
To be sure, it could be argued that this analysis does not 
warrant subordinating appellants' claims because the 
claims seek compensation for a risk that appellants did not 
assume. In particular, although claimants, as equity 
investors, assumed the risk of business failure, they did not 
assume the risk that Telegroup's stock would not be 
publicly tradeable, since they allocated that risk by contract 
to Telegroup. This objection to subordinating appellants' 
claims, however, proves too much, as it would apply equally 
to shareholders' claims for fraud in the issuance. Although 
shareholders do not assume risks that are fraudulently 
concealed from them, shareholder claims alleging fraud in 
the issuance nonetheless fall squarely within the intended 




A comparison of appellants' claims with claims for fraud 
or other illegality in the issuance of the debtor's securities, 
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which appellants concede must be subordinated pursuant 
to S 510(b), further supports the subordination of 
appellants' claims. The policy considerations underlying the 
Congressional judgment in S 510(b) that those who 
purchase the debtor's stock, rather than general unsecured 
creditors, should bear the risk of loss caused by illegality in 
the issuance of the stock, seem to us to apply equally to the 
claims in this case. In both cases, the claim would not exist 
but for claimants' purchase of debtor's stock. In both cases, 
the claim seeks compensation for a decline in the stock's 
value caused by actionable conduct on the debtor's part. 
And in both cases, because the stockholder, as an equity 
investor, assumed the risk of business failure, the 
stockholder must bear the risk, in the event of bankruptcy, 
of any unlawful conduct on the debtor's part that causes 
the stock's value to drop. 
 
That the same policy considerations applicable to claims 
alleging fraud in the issuance of securities apply with equal 
force here is illustrated by considering a hypothetical case 
in which Telegroup did not contractually agree to use its 
best efforts to register its stock, but instead misrepresented 
to buyers at the time of the purchase that Telegroup was 
currently using its best efforts to register the stock. In such 
a case, the stockholders' fraud claims against Telegroup 
would clearly arise from the purchase of Telegroup's stock, 
and therefore would be subordinated pursuant toS 510(b). 
The only difference between that hypothetical and this case 
is that here, instead of fraudulently misrepresenting to 
buyers that it was using its best efforts to register its stock, 
Telegroup breached its contractual obligation to use its best 
efforts to register its stock. 
 
Given that the text of S 510(b) may be reasonably read to 
apply to both claims alleging fraud in the issuance and the 
claims in this case, see supra Section II.A, we see no reason 
as a matter of policy why a fraud claim against Telegroup 
for misrepresenting to buyers that it was using its best 
efforts to register its stock should be subordinated under 
S 510(b), but a contract claim against Telegroup for 
breaching its agreement to use its best efforts to register its 
stock should not. See In re Int'l Wireless Communications 
Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) 
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("Many claims of `defrauded' shareholders could be 
characterized as either [contract or tort claims]. Were we to 
limit the applicability of section 510(b) to tort claims, 
shareholders could easily avoid its effect by asserting that 
a debtor's fraudulent conduct in the sale of its securities 
was a breach of the sales contract."); In re NAL Fin. Group, 
Inc., 237 B.R. 225, 232 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) ("[T]he 
subsequent [breach of contract] is no different than a fraud 
committed during the purchase for purposes of determining 
whether [a claim] . . . should be subordinated under 
S 510(b)."). See generally In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 
F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2001) ("There is nothing in the 
Slain and Kripke analysis to suggest that Congress's 
concern with creditor expectations and equitable risk 
allocation was limited to cases of debtor fraud."); In re Pub. 
Serv. Co. of N.H., 129 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) 
("Although the claim in this case is largely based on fraud, 
the language of 510(b) is broad enough to include breach of 




For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a claim for a 
breach of a provision in a stock purchase agreement 
requiring the issuer to use its best efforts to register its 
stock arises from the purchase or sale of the stock, and 
therefore must be subordinated pursuant to S 510(b).2 
Accordingly, the order of the District Court will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Claimants argue that to subordinate their claims in this case "renders 
most of the language of S 510(b) superfluous," since it would mean that 
"any claim by an equity holder should be subordinated." Appellants' 
Reply Br. at 4. In particular, claimants rely on In re Angeles Corp., 177 
B.R. 920 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995), which stated that: 
 
       If Congress had wanted to subordinate all claims of security 
holders 
       to an equity position, regardless of the source of the claim, 
Congress 
       would have worded Section 510(b) to say: "All claims made by 
       security holders, regardless of the source of the claim, shall be 
       subordinated to an equity class . . ." However, Bankruptcy Code 
       Section 510(b) does not say this. Thus, Section 510(b)'s 
       subordination of claims "arising from the sale or purchase of a 
       security" must mean subordinating less than every claim of a 
       security holder, regardless of how that claim arises. 
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Id. at 927. We agree that in enacting S 510(b), Congress did not intend 
       to subordinate every claim brought by a shareholder, regardless of 
the 
       nature of the claim. We disagree with claimants, however, that the 
       subordination of all claims brought by shareholders is a logical 
       consequence of our holding that claims for the breach of a stock 
       purchase agreement requiring the issuer to use its best efforts to 
register 
       its stock must be subordinated pursuant to S 510(b). Nothing in our 
       rationale would require the subordination of a claim simply because 
the 
       identity of the claimant happens to be a shareholder, where the 
claim 
       lacks any causal relationship to the purchase or sale of stock and 
when 
       subordinating the claims would not further the policies underlying 
       S 510(b), which was intended to prevent shareholders from 
recovering 
       their equity investment in parity with general unsecured creditors. 
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